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Mortal Clients, Immortal Privilege? In re Death of Miller and
the Future of the Posthumous Attorney-Client Privilege in
North Carolina
The circumstances surrounding the death of Wake County
pediatric AIDS researcher Eric Miller are both tragic and intriguing.1
An autopsy indicated that the cause of Miller's December 2, 2000,
death was arsenic poisoning, a condition he first experienced in midNovember of that year.2 Shortly after Miller's death, Derril H.
Willard, Jr., who allegedly was having an affair with Miller's wife
Ann,3 sought the services of Raleigh attorney Richard T. Gammon' in
anticipation of being questioned by police about Eric Miller's death.
Willard met with Gammon on several occasions. Then, on January
22, 2001, Willard was found dead in his garage of a self-inflicted
gunshot wound.5
Suspicious circumstances surrounding Eric Miller's sickness and
subsequent death have contributed to the Wake County District
Attorney's interest in discovering the contents of Willard's
communication with Gammon. First, Willard and Ann Miller were
co-workers at GlaxoSmithKline, where investigators believe each had
access to an arsenic compound.6 Second, Willard purchased and
poured a beer for Miller at a bowling alley on the first night Miller
became sick.7 Although no connection between this action and
Miller's death has been confirmed, it is at least possible, given Miller's

1. See Andrea Weigl, Confidentiality Ruling a Test, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Mar. 31, 2002, at BI.
2. Oren Dorell, Poisoning Victim's Family Marks Somber Anniversary, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 3, 2001, at A12.
3. See Matthew Eisley, State's Top Court Takes Case, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 29, 2002, at Al; Andrea Weigl, New Details Revealed in Miller Case, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 8,2002, at Al.
4. Brief for the State at 4, In re Death of Miller (N.C. Sept. 30, 2002) (No. 303PA02)
[hereinafter Brief for the State], available at http://www.ncappellatecourts.org (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
5. Carole Tanzer Miller, Executors' Power at Issue, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 7, 2002, at A20. Willard's suicide occurred the day after police searched
Willard's home and seized documents and two computers. Dorell, supra note 2. In a note
found at the scene, Willard denied that he killed Miller. Weigl, supra note 1.
6. Weigl, supra note 3. A search of Ann Miller's lab produced 200 milliliters of an
arsenic compound. Dorell, supra note 2. Miller's autopsy later revealed traces of the
same arsenic compound in Miller's liver, blood, and urine. Id.
7. Eisley, supra note 3.
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hospitalization for arsenic poisoning the same night,8 that Miller was
exposed to arsenic at the bowling alley. Third, Willard's wife
disclosed to investigators that Gammon advised her husband that he
could be charged with attempted murder in connection with Miller's
death.9
The well-established rule in North Carolina is that once an
attorney-client relationship exists, an attorney is not permitted to
disclose confidential client communications unless the client
consents.1" The North Carolina Supreme Court "has never ruled on
the kind of attorney-client privilege dilemma at issue in Gammon's
case." H In October 2002, the court heard arguments regarding
whether Gammon must comply with Wake County Superior Court
Judge Donald Stephens's order compelling him to submit for in
camera 12 review any information in his possession relevant to Miller's
death. 3 On the basis of this in camera review, the judge would then
decide whether the information should be disclosed to the Wake
County District Attorney.14 To this point, Gammon has steadfastly
invoked the attorney-client privilege in refusing to comply with the
order.' 5 The North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers supports
8. Dorell, supra note 2.
9. Weigl, supra note 1. This revelation raises an interesting question as to whether
Willard's disclosure of this communication to his wife may amount to waiver of attorneyclient confidentiality. As commentator Paul Rice notes:
The voluntary disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications to a
spouse presents a difficult problem for courts. On the one hand, the spouse is
theoretically no different than any other third party. Therefore, disclosure to
[the spouse] should affect a waiver. On the other hand, disclosures to a spouse
are also protected under the marital communications privilege.
PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE INTHE UNITED STATES § 9:27, at 83 (2d
ed. 1999).
10. See State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 601, 197 S.E.2d 539, 547 (1973);
Dobias v. White, 240 N.C. 680, 684, 83 S.E.2d 785, 788 (1954); Guy v. Bank, 206 N.C. 322,
323, 173 S.E. 600, 601 (1934); Carey v. Carey, 108 N.C. 267, 270, 12 S.E. 1038, 1038 (1891);
see also N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, r. 1.6(c) (June 2002) (prohibiting attorneys from
disclosing confidential client communications, using them against the client, or using them
to the advantage of a third party without the client's consent).
11. Eisley, supra note 3.
12. In camera refers to proceedings conducted in a judge's private chambers, judicial
action in the courtroom in the absence of spectators, or judicial action taken when court is
not in session. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (7th ed. 1999).
13. Eisley, supra note 3.
14. Brief for the State, supra note 4, at 11.
15. Eisley, supra note 3. "If the state Supreme Court orders Gammon to divulge what
his client told him and he refuses, the Raleigh lawyer could be held in contempt, facing
possible jail time and loss of his license to practice law." Andrea Weigl, How Safe Are
Your Secrets? What Your Doctors, Lawyers and Clergy May Reveal, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 7, 2002, at A19.
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Gammon's refusal, and it filed a brief with the Wake County Superior
Court emphasizing that the value of the attorney-client privilege lies
in its encouragement of full and frank communications between
lawyers and clients. 6 While District Attorney C. Colon Willoughby
has not received much support from attorneys in his quest to obtain
the privileged information, he has garnered the support of someone
who may prove to be more influential in this case: Yvette Willard,
Derril H. Willard, Jr.'s wife. In her capacity as executor of her
husband's estate, Yvette Willard has waived the attorney-client
privilege and asked Gammon to disclose to the Raleigh Police
Department and the Wake County District Attorney's office any
information in his possession relevant to Miller's death. 7 Miller's
parents, as co-executors of his estate, agreed to waive any claim
against Willard, thereby releasing his estate from any potential civil
liability that might result from a finding that Willard played a role in
causing Miller's death. 18 Because Willard's will did not authorize his
wife to waive the attorney-client privilege on his behalf, Gammon
believes that Yvette Willard's waiver is insufficient to relieve him of
his obligation to maintain the privilege. 9
Although the Miller case was argued partially on the basis of the
established estate or testamentary exception to the attorney-client
privilege,20 it is a model case for adopting a "good cause" exception of
16. Brief of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent's Claim of Attorney-Client Privilege at 3, In re Death of Miller
(Wake Co. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2002) (No. 02-SP-550).
17. Brief for the State, supra note 4, at 5. At the Superior Court level, Judge Stephens

made findings of fact with regard to Yvette Willard's ability to waive the privilege. Id. at
7-8. The judge found that, as executor of her husband's estate, she had waived any
attorney-client privilege that would prohibit Gammon from disclosing information
regarding Miller's death. Id. Additionally, he found that no evidence before the court
indicated that Willard alone had reserved the right to waive the privilege or that Yvette
Willard had been prohibited from doing so. Id. Gammon's attorneys argue, however, that
Yvette Willard is not empowered by either North Carolina law or the terms of her
husband's will to waive the privilege. Respondent-Appellant's Brief at 37, In re Death of
Miller (N.C. Aug. 16, 2002) (No. 303PA02) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief], available at

http://www.ncappellatecourts.org (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27 (2001) (enumerating the power that may be incorporated in a
trust instrument and omitting reference to the power to waive the attorney-client privilege
on behalf of the estate). But see THOMAS E. SPANN, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 175 (2001)

(pointing out that a client's successor may generally waive the privilege).
18. Brief for the State, supra note 4, at 5-6; see also id. at 31-32 (discussing the
Millers' decision to release the Willard estate from any potential claims).
19. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 17, at 37-38.

20. Id. at 36-42. The testamentary exception provides that when litigation occurs
after a client's death, such as when two or more parties make claims to the proceeds of the
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the kind envisioned by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion in
Swidler & Berlin v. United States.2 This Recent Development
examines In re Death of Miller as a foundational case on which to
construct such a narrow, interest-balancing "good cause" exception to
the posthumous attorney-client privilege in North Carolina.
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Swidler, in which Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined, acknowledged that the benefits of the attorney-

client privilege are generally understood to outweigh the risk of
excluding important pieces of evidence.22 She also pointed out,
however, that situations may arise in which the costs of allowing an
absolute posthumous attorney-client privilege can be unacceptably
high.23 Justice O'Connor illuminated several such situations,
including: (1) where the privilege functions to bar an innocent
criminal defendant from seeking disclosure of a deceased client's
confession to the offense with which the defendant is charged; (2)
where the constitutional rights of the defendant are at stake; and (3)
where there is a compelling law enforcement need for information.24
client's estate, no party may assert the privilege against another. See In re Kemp, 236 N.C.
680, 73 S.E.2d 906 (1953). This exception is widely accepted because it is perceived as
advancing the client's interest in having his estate properly distributed. See United States
v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1340 n.ll (9th Cir. 1977). For a brief discussion of the legal
theories relied on in the Miller case, see generally Molly McDonough, Secrecy Until Death
or Beyond? North Carolina to Rule on Posthumous Attorney-Client Privilege, 1 ABA
JOURNAL EREPORT 41 (2002). See also infra note 25 and accompanying text (giving a
brief overview of the long history of the attorney-client privilege and the reluctance of
courts to expand the category of exceptions to the privilege).
21. 524 U.S. 399, 411-16 (1998) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Swidler, Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr sought disclosure of the notes of James Hamilton, an attorney
consulted by Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr., in the wake of the
firings of several White House Travel Office employees. Id. at 399. Foster committed
suicide nine days after meeting with Hamilton. Id. In blocking Starr's disclosure request,
the Court reaffirmed the common law assumption that the attorney-client privilege
survives the death of a client. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 77 cmt. c (2000) (stating that the attorney-client privilege
survives the death of the client or the termination of the existence of an organization).
22. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 412 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 413 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 233-34
(D.C. Cir. 1997)). Courts often have acknowledged the privilege's tendency to thwart the
search for truth and urged that because of this tendency, the privilege should be narrowly
construed. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (explaining that
evidentiary privileges should not be construed expansively because of their tendency to
impede the search for truth); In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that
accuracy suffers when the privilege operates to conceal information courts need to make
correct decisions); EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 12-13 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing strict construction of
privilege).
24. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 413 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It is the third situation, a
compelling law enforcement need for information, which bears most directly on the Miller
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In the five years since the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Swidler, North Carolina courts have not had occasion to
clarify the scope of the posthumous attorney-client privilege. North
Carolina courts generally have given the attorney-client privilege a
wide berth, allowing exceptions to its application in only a narrow
range of situations, including: (1) where the client discloses to the
attorney that he is planning to commit a crime or fraud (the crimefraud exception); (2) where the client has lodged a malpractice or
ineffective assistance of counsel claim against the attorney or
otherwise waived the privilege; and (3) where the client has died and
the client's executor waives the privilege to allow disclosure of
privileged information for the purpose of settling the estate (the
estate or testamentary exception)." Although most state courts have
been reluctant to alter the contours of the venerable privilege26

case. Had Willard lived, he might have been offered immunity to compel his testimony, or
he might have decided on his own volition to reveal what he knew to the police. His
suicide foreclosed both possibilities. If Gammon is not compelled to testify in Willard's
place, "a complete 'loss of crucial information' "may result. See id. at 412-13 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (quoting 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5498, at 484 (1986)). For an interesting
discussion of the protection of criminal defendants' constitutional rights as a justification
for dispensing with the posthumous attorney-client privilege, see Jon J. Kramer, Supreme
Court Review, Dead Men's Lawyers Tell No Tales: The Attorney-Client Privilege Survives
Death, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 941, 964-72 (1999).
25. See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS AND BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 129, at 427-28 (5th ed. 1998); see also N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, r. 1.6(d)(4)
(June 2002) (explaining that attorneys may disclose confidential information concerning
the intent of a client to commit a crime and any information necessary to prevent the
crime); id. at r. 1.6(d)(5) (providing that attorneys may disclose confidential information to
the extent necessary to remedy the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent
conduct in which the attorney's services were used); State v. Taylor, 327 N.C. 147, 152, 393
S.E.2d 801, 805 (1990) (explaining that when a criminal defendant lodges an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim against his attorney, the defendant in effect waives both the
attorney-client and work product privileges with respect to matters relevant to the claim);
Battle v. State, 8 N.C. App. 192, 197, 174 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1970) (holding that when the
client filed a petition challenging the integrity and abilities of his court-appointed lawyers,
he waived the protection of the attorney-client privilege with respect to matters alleged in
the petition); In re Kemp, 236 N.C. at 684, 73 S.E.2d at 909 (explaining that it is generally
understood that the attorney-client privilege does not bar an attorney from testifying with
regard to confidential communications where conflicting claims to the client's estate arise
after the client's death). See generally Jason Greenberg, Comment, Swidler & Berlin v.
United States ... And Justice for All?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 939, 946 (2000) (describing the
three main exceptions to the attorney-client privilege that courts have carved out over the
years).
26. See Swidler, 524 U.S. at 403 ("The attorney client privilege is one of the oldest
recognized privileges for confidential communications."); Greenberg, supra note 25, at 944
(noting that the attorney-client privilege dates back to sixteenth century England and is
the oldest common law privilege providing for the protection of confidential
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beyond these general categories, recent cases 27 have highlighted the
need for a new exception focused on balancing the interests of law
enforcement in resolving criminal investigations with the interests of
attorneys in maintaining the confidentiality of their communications
with clients. Such exceptions frequently are referred to as "good
cause" exceptions, 28 and their unifying characteristic is that they
incorporate an interest-balancing analysis in determining whether the
attorney-client privilege should be applied posthumously.

communications). For a brief overview of the history of the attorney-client privilege, see
Kramer, supra note 24, at 942-45.
27. The Miller case should not be regarded as an isolated incident constituting an
overly individualized basis on which to construct an interest-balancing exception to the
posthumous attorney-client privilege.
Relatively recent cases presenting similar
circumstances have also called into question whether the attorney-client privilege should
be allowed to apply after the death of the client when the privilege impedes the progress
of a criminal investigation. Although these cases have not necessarily resulted in the
adoption of interest-balancing exceptions, the recent cases at least demonstrate the
broader need for privilege exceptions in criminal investigations.
One case centers on the investigation into the whereabouts of nine-year-old Erica
Baker, who disappeared while walking her dog in February 1999. Janice Morse, Lawyer's
Refusal Ripples, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 24, 2002, at B1. Prosecutors believe that
the attorney for Jan Marie Franks, a homeless woman who died in December 2001, may
know what happened to Erica. Id. Reports from a tip hotline indicated that Franks was a
passenger in a van that struck, and presumably killed, Erica. Id. Franks's husband
executed a waiver pursuant to a section of Ohio law that allows the attorney-client
privilege to be waived if a surviving spouse agrees to the disclosure in question. Id.
Despite the waiver, Lewis has refused to disclose any information conveyed to her by
Franks. Id.
Another case, In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass.
1990), presented facts quite similar to the Miller case. Charles Stuart was accused of
murdering his pregnant wife, who died in the hospital shortly after giving birth to their
child. Simon J. Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of the Client, 6 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 45 (1992). When Stuart's brother came forward with information
implicating Stuart in the murder, Stuart allegedly confessed the murder to his attorney.
Id. The next day Stuart's body was discovered in a nearby river; he had apparently
jumped to his death. Id. The Massachusetts court ultimately denied prosecutors' attempts
to force Stuart's attorney to testify about what Stuart told him, but, in a strong dissent,
Judge Nolan acknowledged that the court should have considered a narrow interestbalancing exception to the rule of posthumous attorney-client privilege under these facts.
In re John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 72 (Nolan, J., dissenting). Judge Nolan went on to criticize
the decision for its failure to put in place a "safety valve" by which the privilege could be
overridden when the interests of justice so require. Id. at 73 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
28. RICE, supra note 9, § 8:1, at 18 n.39 ("The 'balancing' test (occasionally referred
to as a 'good cause' test) balances the need for the privileged information against the
benefit derived from the privilege's suppression of that information."). Ten states have
adopted some form of the "good cause exception." Id. at 19. Of these ten states, four
have signaled their acquiescence to piercing the posthumous attorney-client privilege in an
appropriate case, but have not yet encountered such a case. Id. The remaining six states
have used the exception almost exclusively in criminal cases in which the defendant's
rights to confrontation and to mount an effective defense were implicated. Id.
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In Swidler, Justice O'Connor wrote that where "a compelling law
enforcement interest is at stake ...the cost of silence warrants a
narrow exception to the rule that the attorney-client privilege
survives the death of the client. '29 The burden of persuading the
North Carolina Supreme Court of the value of the privilege over any
competing interests rests with the proponent of the privilege,3" here,
Gammon. In this case, the Raleigh Police Department and the Wake
County District Attorney's office have a competing interest: solving
Miller's homicide case. Because Willard's suicide foreclosed the
possibility of obtaining that information directly, law enforcement
officials were left with no other source from which to obtain Willard's
testimony except Gammon. Under the balancing approach described
by Justice O'Connor,3 1 for Gammon to prevail, he would need to
show that Willard's posthumous interest in confidentiality overrides
the interests of law enforcement officials in obtaining the information
necessary to resolve the Miller homicide case.
Because the majority in Swidler based its opinion on federal
common law, rather than constitutional principles, its holding is not
binding on the states.32 As such, the states are free to define the
limitations of the posthumous attorney-client privilege in conformity
with their distinct statutory and common law systems. While Justice
O'Connor's balancing approach does not constitute a very specific
exception to the posthumous attorney-client privilege, several guiding
principles emerge from her dissenting opinion that would allow the
North Carolina Supreme Court to formulate a new exception. The
first principle is that the privilege should apply only to the extent
necessary to accomplish its purpose; where the privilege seems only
to serve as an obstacle to the fair administration of justice, it should

29. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 416 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Scott v. Scott, 106 N.C. App. 606, 612, 417 S.E.2d 818, 823 (1992) ("The burden is
on the proponent of the privilege to demonstrate that the privilege should be applied."),
affd, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994). For additional authority on this point, see
United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that "the proponent of

the privilege ...must prove its applicability"), and Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v.
Kittinger/Penn. House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1987) ("The proponent of
the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving its applicability.").
31. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 415-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

32. See RICE, supra note 9, § 2:1, at 6 n.1 (explaining that the attorney-client privilege
is shaped by state and federal common law, rather than constitutional law); Richard C.
Wydick, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Does It Really Have Life Everlasting?, 87 KY. L.J.
1165, 1189 (1999) ("Swidler & Berlin tells us that, in a case governed by the federal

common law of privilege, the privilege remains intact after the client dies ....
" (emphasis
added)).
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be carefully examined.33 With this principle in mind, any proposed
exception to the posthumous attorney-client privilege must limit
invocations of the privilege that exceed the boundaries of the
privilege's purpose. To do so requires careful articulation of that
purpose.
In his 1986 article, Professor David J. Fried identified two
justifications for the attorney-client privilege, the instrumental and
intrinsic justifications, each of which is based on some conception of
the privilege's purpose.34 The instrumental justification emerges from
the idea that the privilege exists to foster the provision of legal advice
to clients who might not seek such advice if they thought their
attorneys could be forced to disclose their confidences.
This
36
justification resonates in In re Sealed Case, the Swidler case as
presented to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in which the court acknowledged that "[t]he justification
for the attorney-client privilege has largely been an instrumental one,
resting on a belief that it greatly facilitates-perhaps is essential tothe provision of legal advice."37 Under this justification, the privilege
is perceived to accomplish its proper purpose so long as clients
remain willing to confide in their attorneys.38
By contrast, the intrinsic value justification focuses less on the
function of the privilege and more on the relationship between
attorney and client.3" Under this justification, the attorney-client
relationship is analogized to other privileged relationships, such as
those between husbands and wives and between priests and penitents,
which exist for the purpose of preventing betrayal of intimate
information shared in such relationships.4" The intrinsic value
justification takes the view that the information protected by the
33. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 412 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
34. David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds,64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 490 (1986). For an
expanded discussion of the instrumental and intrinsic (non-instrumental) justifications, see
Wydick, supra note 32, at 1173-76.
35. Fried, supra note 34, at 490.
36. 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399 (1998).
37. Id. at 233.
38. Fried, supra note 34, at 491. This justification for the privilege is narrow, but some
authorities conclude that because there is no real substitute for legal advice, there is no
reason that the privilege should not be narrowed even further or abolished outright. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See generally Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundationsof
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (comparing the traditional role of a
lawyer as a professional having certain ethical obligations with the ideal that an individual
should follow moral principles over ethical guidelines).
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privilege is nearly identical to that protected by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, such that "[t]here is little moral difference between
convicting a client by testimony compelled from his or her own mouth
and convicting a client by testimony compelled from his or her
attorney's mouth."4 The justification is rarely discussed by courts,
which tend to favor the instrumental justification.42
Still, the
emotional appeal of this justification is considerable because it
identifies the attorney-client privilege as protecting an intimate,
inviolable relationship between attorney and client.
The privilege's purpose has figured prominently in the Miller
case. One of Gammon's most powerful arguments for maintaining
the privilege is rooted in the instrumental justification, explained
above: "Like Vince Foster, 'it seems quite plausible that [Willard],
perhaps already contemplating suicide, may not have sought legal
advice from [Gammon] if he had not been assured the conversation
was privileged.' "' From this premise, Gammon reasons that any loss
of evidence resulting from his invocation of the privilege is justified
because the evidence would not have existed but for the attorneyclient privilege." This argument, however, fails to adequately take
into account the irreplaceable nature of legal counsel.
Some
authorities argue that because there is no real substitute for legal
advice, there is no reason to sustain a broad attorney-client privilege
on the grounds that it encourages otherwise reluctant persons to seek
legal advice when they need it.45 To accept Gammon's argument, we
41. Fried, supra note 34, at 492.
42. Frankel, supra note 27, at 45.
43. Appellant's Brief, supra note 17, at 34 (citing Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1998); see supra note 21 (discussing the Swidler case and the
circumstances surrounding Foster's suicide). Like Willard, Foster committed suicide soon
after consulting with his attorney, thereby giving rise to the inference that he may have
already been considering suicide prior to the consultation. See supra note 21 (stating that
Foster committed suicide nine days after meeting with his attorney).
The instrumental justification seems to assume that the average client is wellversed enough in the intricacies of the attorney-client privilege to know that it is generally
believed to survive the client's death and to therefore base a decision either to seek or not
seek legal advice on that knowledge. But see Wydick, supra note 32, at 1172 n.45
(summarizing Professor Zacharias's 1989 "Rethinking Confidentiality" study, which
concluded that most clients are not well-informed about the extent to which the attorney's
duty of confidentiality applies).
44. Appellant's Brief, supra note 17, at 34.
45. Fried, supra note 34, at 491; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle
in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the
Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 241, 254 (2002) (briefly describing
empirical studies suggesting that very few laypersons would be discouraged from seeking
professional advice in the absence of a privilege protecting confidentiality); Fred C.
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 364 (1989) (suggesting that,
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must assume that Willard would have preferred to undergo police
questioning and any subsequent legal proceedings alone rather than
confide in an attorney who might, under narrow circumstances, be
compelled to reveal those confidences after his death. Given the
circumstantial evidence mounting against him prior to his death,46 it is
unlikely that Willard would have foregone legal advice on this basis
alone.
It has never been conclusively proven that the attorney-client
privilege guarantees full and frank communications between
attorneys and their clients.47 Thus, this idea should not function as a
bar to the adoption of a narrow exception to the posthumous
attorney-client privilege in the Miller case. Given that the primary
purpose of the posthumous attorney-client privilege (the preservation
of full and frank attorney-client communications) may be based on
nothing more than shaky assumptions about the motivations of clients
in seeking legal advice, courts should consider whether a privilege so
premised should be allowed presumptively to stand in the way of
serious criminal investigations, the resolution of which may hinge on
disclosure of privileged information.
The second principle raised in the O'Connor dissent
acknowledges that while deceased clients continue to hold certain
interests in confidentiality, the consequences associated with
disclosure of the confidential information are substantially less
serious following the client's death.4 8 While the client's individual
interests in confidentiality may be less significant after death, other
important interests in maintaining confidentiality remain. Writing for
the majority in Swidler, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that
limiting posthumous disclosure of confidential communications to the
criminal context might reduce the fears of some clients and therefore
preserve the frankness of their communications to their attorneys.
He also pointed out, however, that clients who are concerned about
their reputations, potential civil liability, and possible harm to their
even if more exceptions to confidentiality existed, laypersons would continue to use
lawyers because of their pressing needs for professional legal advice); Note, The AttorneyClient Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 464, 470-71 (1977) (stating that "[c]lients seek out attorneys and will continue to do
so largely because there is no ready substitute for legal advice" and because the harms that

might result from disclosure of confidential information are likely to be outweighed by the
costs of keeping information from their attorneys).
46. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
47. RICE, supra note 9, § 2:3, at 18.

48. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 412 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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family and friends may in fact fear posthumous disclosure as much as
disclosure during the client's life.49
In the Miller case, each of Justice Rehnquist's concerns may be
alleviated by an examination of the surrounding facts. First, Willard's
suicide foreclosed the possibility of him being held criminally
responsible for any role he may have played in bringing about
Miller's death.50 Second, the possibility that civil sanctions could be
levied upon his estate also was eliminated when Miller's parents
agreed to release the estate from civil liability."1
Although reputational concerns certainly could extend beyond
the life of the client, these concerns are widely understood to be most
relevant during the life of the client.5 2 Another concern expressed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "possible harm to friends or family, '53 also
seems unlikely to be implicated in the Miller case: "Yvette Willard
said [her husband] told her to decide what she should do for herself
and their 2-year-old daughter. 'He told me before he died that what I
did would be entirely up to me-whatever I thought would be best for
me and Kelsey,' she said."54 Yvette Willard's choice to waive the
attorney-client privilege in the interest of bringing closure to the
situation strongly indicates that the family Willard left behind is
willing to face the possible harm associated with disclosure.

49. Id. at 407. But see 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5498, at 484 (1986) (stating that "[o]ne would

have to attribute a Pharaoh-like concern for immortality to suppose that the typical client
has much concern for how posterity may view his communications").
50. For an interesting analysis of the legal significance of suicide, see generally
Michael Paulsen, Dead Man's Privilege: Vince Foster and the Demise of Legal Ethics, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1999).

51. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
52. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recognized:
To the extent that concern over reputation arises from an interest in the sort of
treatment a person will receive from others ... it ends with death. But there are
aspects of after-death reputation that will concern a person while alive-the value
to surviving family of being related to (say) an honorable and distinguished
person, and the value of one's posthumous reputation simpliciter ....
In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). See generally Gugliuzza v. K.C.M.C., Inc., 606 So.2d
790 (La. 1992) (explaining in the context of a defamation case that after a person dies,
there is no longer a reputation that can be injured or that the law can protect); Jessica
Berg, Grave Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 34 CONN.
L. REv. 81, 95 (2001) (arguing that a person's interests in confidentiality for the purpose
of controlling the manner in which their identities are perceived are stronger during life
than after death).
53. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 407.
54. Weigl, supra note 3.
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In her article discussing confidentiality in the medical context,
Professor Jessica Berg explained that living persons may suffer two
levels of harm as a result of the disclosure of a confidential
communication: those harms resulting from having information
known that they did not wish to be known and those more personal
harms resulting from knowing that their wishes regarding
confidentiality were not respected.55 Where a deceased person is
concerned, however, the potential harms are diminished. For
example, while a deceased person might have an interest in
posthumous preservation of confidentiality, he will suffer none of the
consequences a living person might face if that confidentiality is
breached. 6 Neither will a deceased person experience the personal
affront of knowing that his desire for confidentiality was not
respected.
It follows that posthumous disclosure of confidential
information generally is less harmful to the client than disclosure
during his lifetime. 8
Professor Berg's analysis is applicable to the Miller case.
Common sense dictates that Willard, like most of us, probably wanted
to be remembered in a favorable light and, for that reason, might
have desired that his communications with Gammon remain
confidential even after his death.
Even if disclosure of his
communications with Gammon produces information that casts
Willard in a negative light, however, Willard himself will suffer none
of the consequences. Additionally, he cannot experience the feeling
of betrayal that might have accompanied any disclosure by Gammon
while he was living.
The importance of a sound reputation, even posthumously,
should not be lightly dismissed as a goal of clients seeking legal
counsel. Still, its importance must be weighed against any competing
interests in deciding whether to compel disclosure of confidential
information after a client's death.
Preservation of Willard's
reputational interests, especially when weighed against the interests
of law enforcement in proceeding with its investigation into Miller's

55. Berg, supra note 52, at 95 (discussing legal and ethical issues surrounding the
posthumous disclosure of confidential information of medical patients).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., id. (concluding that the notion of harm to identity is difficult to define
with respect to the living and even more difficult with respect to the dead: "[Allthough
the dead may have some interests in maintaining confidentiality postmortem, this interest
is not as strong as it is when the patient is living. Thus, other interests may take
precedence when weighing the appropriateness of confidentiality versus disclosure.").
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murder, does not seem to be a proper basis on which to sustain the
attorney-client privilege posthumously.
The third principle emerging from Justice O'Connor's dissent
centers on the idea that if the privilege bars an attorney from
testifying, then "a complete 'loss of crucial information' will often
result."59 A strong argument against the adoption of "good cause"60
exceptions is that "privileged communications kept from the court do
not really represent a 'loss' of evidence since the client would not
have written or uttered the words absent the safeguards of the
attorney-client privilege."6 1 Although this is a strong argument in the
abstract, there is some reason to believe that Willard could have been
persuaded to cooperate with investigators had he lived. Prior to
Willard's consultations with Gammon, investigators already were
interested in questioning him in connection with Miller's death, but
Willard simply avoided them.6"
Presumably, Willard sought
Gammon's advice in anticipation of having to answer investigators'
questions. Had Willard lived and cooperated with investigators, his
testimony could have been elicited in a number of ways; Willard
might have offered it of his own volition, or he could have been
offered immunity in exchange for his testimony. Although these
possibilities are purely speculative, the premise underlying the
argument-that a crucial loss of information does not result from
posthumous invocation of the attorney-client privilege because the
client would never have disclosed the information but for the
attorney-client privilege-is also speculative. Obviously, there is no
way to know whether Willard would have provided investigators with
crucial information had he lived, but there is also no reason to
conclude that he never would have disclosed such information to
anyone except his attorney under the promise of confidentiality.
The final, and perhaps most important, principle to draw from
Justice O'Connor's dissent is that "[w]hen the [attorney-client]
privilege is asserted in the criminal context, and a showing is made
that the communications at issue contain necessary factual
59. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 24 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 5498, at 484 (1986)).
60. RICE, supra note 9, § 8:1, at 19 n.39 (quoting Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d
1093 (5th Cir. 1970)).
61. Id. § 2:3, at 21; see also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing the
validity of the instrumental justification for the attorney-client privilege, which focuses on
the idea that the privilege encourages people who might not otherwise seek legal counsel
to do so).
62. See Weigl, supra note 3.
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information not otherwise available, courts should be permitted to
assess whether interests in fairness and accuracy outweigh the
justifications for the privilege."63
This principle provides the
foundation of a narrow balancing test presented as a discretionary
judicial tool for use in addition to the recognized exceptions.
The American Law Institute ("ALI") outlined a similar
approach in a comment to the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers.64 Although the Institute acknowledged that the
law currently recognizes no exception to the rule that the attorneyclient privilege survives death, it nonetheless set out several
considerations supporting such an exception.65 In setting forth the
considerations, the ALI, like Justice O'Connor, recognized the
desirability of permitting judges to implement need-based exceptions
on a case-by-case basis after weighing the interests in confidentiality
against compelling needs for disclosure.66

Either of these applications of the balancing approach easily
could be incorporated into existing North Carolina law regarding the
attorney-client privilege. The North Carolina Rules of Evidence
would govern the application of the principles embodied in Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Swidler to the state's attorney-client privilege
jurisprudence. North Carolina Rule of Evidence 501 mandates that
"[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States, the privileges of a witness, person, government, state, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
the law of this State. ' 67 By contrast, Federal Rule of Evidence 501
provides that privileges are governed by common law principles as
interpreted by courts of the United States "in the light of reason and
experience. '6 The North Carolina and federal rules governing the
63. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 413-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 77 cmt. d (2000).

Like Justice O'Connor, the Restatement identifies courts as the proper arbiters of when
and how an attorney should be compelled to disclose the confidential communications of
her deceased clients. Id. The Restatement further addresses the issue of waiver by a
personal representative of the deceased client's privilege, but concludes that the more
direct approach would be to allow the judge conducting the proceedings in which the
evidence is proffered to make the determination based on a set of relevant factors. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Comment d to the Restatement goes to great lengths to point out that a needbased exception to the privilege has never been approved by legislatures or courts. Id.
The ALI follows this disclaimer with a detailed description of how a need-based exception
would function, which possibly signals a shift in favor of such exceptions among some
attorneys.
67. N.C. R. EVID. 501.
68. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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operation of evidentiary privileges are therefore similar in that each
derives from the common law of its respective jurisdiction. But, the
manner in which the North Carolina rule governs the posthumous
attorney-client privilege is necessarily different from the manner in
which it is governed under the comparable federal rule. Because in
Swidler the Supreme Court so clearly rejected the notion of an
interest-balancing exception 69 and because that decision is now a part
of federal common law, it might be futile for a party to now propose
that a federal court adopt an interest-balancing exception. In North
Carolina, however, the absolute nature of the attorney-client privilege
has yet to be challenged in a context similar to that presented in
Swidler.7 ° For that reason, the common law is not hostile to the
concept of an interest-balancing exception, and it would appear at
least possible that North Carolina courts could allow the exception
consistent with Rule 501.
In North Carolina, implementation of a new exception would not
revolutionize the state's attorney-client privilege jurisprudence
because North Carolina is one of twenty-four states that have not yet
adopted a modern privilege rule.7
Currently, attorneys can be
judicially compelled to disclose confidential attorney-client
communications in certain circumstances.7 2 Therefore, the privilege,

69. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998).
70. See Eisley, supra note 3.
71. "Modern privilege rules" are attorney-client privilege rules "patterned on Unif R.
Evid. 502 (1974) (amended 1986), deleted Fed. R. Evid. 503, Unif. R. Evid. 26 (1953), or
Model Code of Evid. 209-10 (1942)." Wydick, supra note 32, at 1181 n.89 (citations and
internal references omitted). Modern privilege rules essentially codify and define the
parameters of the attorney-client privilege. Rejected Rule 503, for example, not only
stated the general rule of attorney-client privilege, it also established who could claim it
and enumerated the exceptions to the privilege. Because North Carolina has not adopted
a modern privilege rule, there is no definitive list of exceptions the state's courts will find
acceptable. As such, North Carolina could embrace a new exception without having to
amend or contradict existing statutory law. The twenty-four states that had not adopted
such rules as of 1998 are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 1181 n.88.
72. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, r. 1.6(d)(3) (June 2002). The North Carolina
Administrative Code states:
If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent
waiver by the client, paragraph (c) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege
when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or
other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information
about the client.
Id. at cmt. 20. Like the need-based exception, the procedure outlined in this rule
designates the court as the arbiter of the interests raised when a lawyer raises the attorney-
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while closely guarded, is not absolute. Adopting an interestbalancing exception to the posthumous attorney-client privilege
would not require repealing statutes 73 or overhauling the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Rather, North Carolina may embrace the
exception simply by choosing to employ it in the context of an
74
appropriate case.
Under existing common law in North Carolina,
the attorney client privilege exists if: (1) the relation of
attorney and client existed at the time the communication
was made, (2) the communication was made in confidence,
(3) the communication relates to a matter about which the
attorney
was
professionally
consulted,
(4)
the
communication was made in the course of giving or seeking
legal advice for a proper purpose although litigation need
not be contemplated, and (5) the client has not waived the
privilege.75
Under this definition, it appears likely that an attorney-client
relationship existed between Willard and Gammon. Willard went to
Gammon seeking legal advice in anticipation of being questioned by
police about the death of Eric Miller. Presumably he discussed with
Gammon the circumstances surrounding Miller's death and received
an opinion from Gammon as to whether he could face criminal
charges.76 Because the North Carolina Supreme Court has never
ruled on a privilege question of the kind presented by Gammon's
case, however, it is less clear, on the basis of state common law,
whether the attorney-client privilege resulting from Willard's
consultation with Gammon absolutely survived Willard's death.
Unless the court rests its decision entirely on the validity of Yvette

client privilege. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the ALI's view
that courts are the best arbiters of attorney-client privilege dilemmas).
73. The North Carolina General Statutes do not address the attorney-client privilege
directly. They only establish confidentiality guidelines for some of the following
privileged relationships:
physician-patient; clergyman-communicant; psychologistclient/patient; school counselor-student; and social worker-client. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 853 to 8-53.7 (2000).
74. Because the operation of the attorney-client privilege in North Carolina is
controlled by state common law, it follows that any changes to the operation of the
privilege would emerge from case law. See N.C. R. EvID. 501 (indicating that privileges
are determined in accordance with the law of the state).
75. Miles v. Martin, 147 N.C. App. 255, 259, 555 S.E.2d. 361, 364 (2001) (citing State v.
Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 531,284 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1981)).
76. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting Yvette Willard's claim that
Gammon advised her husband that he could be charged with attempted murder).
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Willard's waiver of the privilege, the decision in the Miller case
should clarify the scope of the posthumous attorney-client privilege.
Most court references to the posthumous application of the
attorney-client privilege have arisen in the context of disclosures
made pursuant to the testamentary exception.7 7 The Supreme Court
in Swidler endorsed disclosure under this exception because it tends
to advance the client's interests.78 In approving this exception on the
basis of its conformity with the client's intent, the Court implicitly
includes in the universal client's intent the affirmative desire that any
other privileged communications remain eternally privileged.79 If
there was a clear empirical basis for imputing such a subjective intent
to clients with regard to the posthumous treatment of the privilege,
such an implication might make sense. Because no clear empirical
basis exists,8" it is not unreasonable to posit that the Court's basis for
rejecting a new interest-balancing exception to the privilege is as
speculative as the "no harm in one more exception rationale"8 1 the
Court ascribes to the proponents of the new exception.
In re Death of Miller exemplifies the rare case in which an
interest-balancing exception to the posthumous attorney-client
privilege is entirely in order. The exception to the posthumous
attorney-client privilege as derived from analysis of Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Swidler and the circumstances of the Miller
case might take the following form: where a judge determines
through in camera review of privileged information that the
invocation of the posthumous attorney-client privilege (1) no longer
reasonably serves the interests of a deceased client and (2) obstructs
resolution of the investigation of a serious crime, such as homicide,
(3) by withholding crucial information not otherwise available to law
enforcement, the attorney-client privilege should not bar access to the
information for use in criminal proceedings. 2
77. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 402 (1998); see also Frankel, supra

note 27, at 58 n.65 (examining 400 cases in which the client was dead and the application
of the attorney-client privilege was at issue, and concluding that in ninety-five percent of

the cases, the issue was raised in the testamentary context).
78. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 405.
79. Id. at 409-10 (explaining that the established exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege do not conflict with the privilege's purposes, whereas a posthumous exception
applied in the criminal context would come into conflict with the goals of promoting open

communication and protecting the client's interests).
80. Id. at 409-10 n.4 ("Empirical evidence on the privilege is limited. Three studies
do not reach firm conclusions on whether limiting the privilege would discourage full and
frank communication." (citations omitted)).
81. Id. at 410.
dissenting).
82. Id. at 413 (O'Connor, J.,
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The second and third prongs of the proposed exception are
rather easily satisfied in the Miller case. First, Gammon's refusal to
submit the information he learned from Willard for in camera review
poses an obvious impediment to the investigation of Miller's death.
Second, there appears to be no other source from which investigators
can obtain Willard's testimony, now that Willard is deceased.
Although these two prongs of the exception call for relatively
concrete judgments, the first prong will probably be more difficult for
courts to confront.
The first prong presents some difficulty for courts because it
requires them to evaluate the client's interests in the maintenance of
the privilege. From consideration of the instrumental justification for
the privilege, courts might conclude that the client's most significant
interest is in obtaining legal advice, often for the purpose of avoiding
criminal prosecution or civil liability. 3 However, the client's death
renders this interest moot. The remaining interests identified by
Justice Rehnquist in Swidler, those touching primarily on reputation
and the effects of disclosure on those left behind, therefore are likely
to dominate analysis under the first prong.84 To the extent that a
client's interests in the attorney-client privilege are not generally
quantifiable, courts will have to make this first determination on a
case-by-case basis by examining the surrounding factual
circumstances and the probable effects of disclosure of confidential
communications.
In the Miller case, it is possible to conclude on the basis of the
facts that most of Willard's interests are no longer served by the
persistence of the attorney-client privilege; namely, Willard's death
foreclosed the possibility of criminal punishment. The Millers' waiver
of any claims to Willard's estate also eliminated the possibility of civil
liability. 5 Additionally, Yvette Willard has waived the attorneyclient privilege on her husband's behalf, in effect signaling the
willingness of Willard's survivors to face the consequences of the
disclosure.86 What remains, Willard's own interest in the maintenance
of a good reputation, seems a weak basis for upholding the privilege
in light of its obstruction of a homicide investigation. Therefore, the
application of the proposed interest-balancing exception to the Miller
83. See generally Fried, supra note 34, at 490 (identifying that the instrumental value
of the attorney-client privilege is its tendency to encourage people to seek legal advice).
84. See Swidler, 524 U.S. at 407.
85. See Brief for the State, supra note 4, at 5-6, 31-32 (discussing the Millers' decision
to waive any claims against the Willard estate).
86. See id. at 5.
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case would have the very constrained effect of providing investigators
with information crucial to bringing about resolution of the homicide
investigation. Although disclosure potentially could have a negative
impact on Willard's memory, press coverage reporting on Willard's
alleged links to Miller's murder may already have had that effect.87
No privilege should be self-perpetuating in the sense that it may

88
be successfully invoked for the sole purpose of preserving itself.
Based on the circumstances surrounding Willard's disclosures and his
subsequent death, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the
attorney-client privilege is being asserted here for the purpose of such
self-perpetuation, rather than for the proper purpose of concealing
those confidential communications that may truly harm the deceased

client's interests.

In applying the attorney-client privilege in the legally hazy
posthumous realm, courts should never cease to question the

privilege where it seems to thwart the search for truth for no more
compelling a reason than it has always been allowed to do so at
common law. Additionally, "[i]f one were legislating for a new
commonwealth, without history or customs, it might be hard to
maintain that a privilege for lawyer-client communications would
facilitate more than it would obstruct the administration of justice.
But we are not writing on a blank slate."89 If the existing attorney-

client privilege is to remain responsive to the changing needs of
justice and the "central truth-seeking function of the courts,"9 it must
be capable of tolerating reasonably drawn exceptions to its principles.
87. See, e.g., supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (illustrating news coverage
regarding Willard's alleged involvement in Miller's death).
88. See generally Swidler, 524 U.S. at 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("We are
reluctant to recognize a privilege or read an existing one expansively unless to do so will
serve a 'public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining truth.' " (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
50 (1980))); see also State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 595, 276 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1981)
(stating that in a situation in which adherence to precedent is the sole reason for
supporting a common law rule, courts must reconsider the rule); Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C.
App. 460, 496, 322 S.E.2d 780, 803 (1984) (stating that courts should reexamine common
law rules in situations in which they cannot achieve their purpose and where their
application is supported only by precedent), vacated by 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888
(1985).
89. Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 691 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (quoting
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 176 (2d ed. 1972)) (emphasis added). Justice
O'Connor cited Cohen in her Swidler dissent for the proposition that the attorney-client
privilege should be carefully examined where it is apparent that the interests of justice can
only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 412 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
90. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 413 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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In the Miller case, the North Carolina Supreme Court is presented
with an opportunity to craft such an exception in a very narrow and
precise manner. Seizing the opportunity does not constitute wiping
clean the slate of attorney-client privilege. It merely clarifies the
privilege's life span by allowing it to exist only so long as it serves the
legitimate interests of clients, who are, after all, mere mortals
incapable of deriving much benefit from an immortal privilege.
DESIRt D. EDWARDS

